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Abstract 
The Global Compacts on Migration (GCM) and Refugees (GCR) include policy recommendations that 
aim to increase opportunities for legal labour migration, improve protections for migrant workers, and 
provide refugees with ‘complementary pathways’ to enhanced protection via labour mobility. This paper 
explains why there are large gaps between these policy recommendations and the labour market policies 
and realities in the countries that host most of the world’s migrant workers. These gaps between ideals 
and realities are likely to limit the effective implementation of the GCM/GCR recommendations on 
labour migration. More ‘labour market realism’ is needed to incrementally but effectively improve 
protections for migrant workers. 
Keywords 
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  1 
Introduction* 
The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), and the separate Global Compact 
on Refugees (GCR), are new UN agreements made in 2018 to promote more effective international 
cooperation on international migration and the protection of refugees. These compacts are not legally 
binding, but they lay out goals and policy commitments that governments are urged to embrace to better 
regulate international migration and refugee flows.  
GCM recommendation1 five calls on governments to develop pathways for regular migration that 
reflect “demographic and global labour market realities” and to implement labour mobility schemes for 
“temporary, seasonal, circular, and fast-track programmes in areas of labour shortages.” The compact 
calls on governments to allow all migrant workers to bring or unify their families abroad and to provide 
any accompanying family members with “work authorization, and access to social security and 
services.” GCM recommendation six calls for fair and ethical recruitment and portable visas that allow 
migrants to change employers and to change the duration of their stay abroad “with minimal 
administrative burden.” The GCR recommendations include “complementary pathways for admission 
to third countries” with more “labour mobility opportunities for refugees, including through the 
identification of refugees with skills that are needed in third countries.”  
This paper explains why there are major gaps between these GCM/GCR policy recommendations 
and the realities of migrant labour markets and labour immigration policies, especially in the high-
income countries that host two-thirds of the world’s migrant workers (ILO, 2018). We assess each of 
the three recommendations in light of the realities of how the governments that host most of the world’s 
migrant workers currently regulate their admission and rights. The GCM recommendations ignore some 
of the fundamental concepts underpinning temporary labour migration programmes, such as 
governmental requirements that employers should try to recruit local workers before receiving 
permission to hire migrant workers. As a consequence, it is highly unlikely that the core aspects of GCM 
recommendations five and six will be implemented by the countries that host most migrant workers. 
Similarly, there may be limited scope for creating labour mobility opportunities for refugees, but 
practical obstacles suggest that few refugees can be turned into migrant workers. We conclude that the 
labour recommendations of the new Global Compacts are unlikely to make significant impacts, and urge 
more ‘labour market realism’ in thinking about international labour migration by focusing on targeted 
recommendations that yield incremental but effective improvements for migrant workers.  
Realities of labour immigration policy-making 
The United Nations Population Division (2017) reported 258 million migrants in the world in 2017. The 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that 164 million of these migrants, equivalent to 70 
percent of all migrants 15 and older, were in the labour force of the countries to which they had moved 
(ILO 2018). Given an estimated 150 million migrant workers in 2013, this suggests an average increase 
of 3.5 million in the stock of migrant workers each year between 2013 and 2017. According to the same 
                                                     
* For helpful comments on an earlier draft, the authors are grateful to Bruce Cohen, Marie McAuliffe, and Henry Sherrell. 
Responsibility for the analysis and arguments expressed in this paper lies with the authors alone. This is work in progress, 
so comments are very welcome.  
1 It is important to note that the term “recommendation” is not used in GCM or GCR. GCM includes a list of “principles” 
and 23 “objectives”, each of which is accompanied by a “commitment” to a specific policy goal and a “range of actions 
considered to be relevant policy instruments and best practices” (para 16.). Similarly, the GCR includes “principles”, 
“objectives”, and a “programme of action”. Many of these objectives and actions clearly constitute (a menu of) “policy 
recommendations” (as the term is commonly understood), so we use “policy recommendations” for linguistic convenience 
in this paper.  
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ILO estimates, men were 58 percent of migrant workers in 2017. The share of men 15 and older who 
were in the labour force was 75 percent for both migrant and non-migrant men, but the share of migrant 
women in the labour force, 64 percent, was higher than for non-migrant women, 48 percent. 
In 2017, 111 million migrant workers, 68 percent of the global total, were in the high-income 
countries that have a sixth of the world’s 3.5 billion workers. Migrants constituted almost 20 percent of 
workers in high-income countries, and less than five percent of workers in low-income countries. By 
region, 24 percent of migrant workers in 2017 were in Europe, 23 percent were in North America, and 
14 percent were in the Arab states. Almost 41 percent of all workers in the Arab states were migrants, 
followed by 21 percent of all workers in North America and 18 percent of all workers in Europe (ILO, 
2018). 
Many of the 164 million migrant workers have been admitted to their current host countries under 
labour immigration programmes, i.e. migration policies specifically designed to facilitate the admission 
and employment of migrant workers. A considerable number have been admitted under other legal 
immigration channels, e.g. as family members, students, or refugees, that offer, either immediately or 
after some time, the legal right to work. In some parts of the world, especially in Europe, large numbers 
of migrant workers have also moved across borders under “free movement agreements.” Some migrant 
workers are residing and/or working illegally, although they constitute a small minority.  
The great majority of labour immigration programmes in high-income countries are temporary 
migration programmes (TMPs), that is, programmes that grant temporary residence status on arrival 
(although some allow a transfer to permanent residence status after some time). The countries that in the 
past prioritised the admission of migrant workers with permanent residence status on arrival, such as 
Australia and Canada, have expanded their temporary migrant worker programmes over the past two 
decades. In both Australia and Canada, the number of migrants admitted as temporary workers now 
exceeds the number of migrant workers admitted with immediate permanent residence status.  
Most countries operate a range of temporary labour immigration programmes targeted at migrant 
workers with different skills. Programmes for high- and lower-skilled workers typically have different 
admissions criteria and rights for migrant workers. For example, most labour migration programmes 
that allow the entry of higher-skilled migrant workers place fewer restrictions on admission, and often 
grant migrants more rights, including access to welfare and rights to family reunion, than programmes 
that admit lower-skilled migrants. Labour migration programmes in many high-income countries are 
characterized by trade-offs between openness and some migrant rights, that is, programmes that are 
more open to admitting migrant workers are also more restrictive with regard to welfare and residence 
rights. This trade-off can be found across programmes targeting migrants with different skills, but not 
in programmes that specifically target the most highly skilled workers for whom there is intense 
international competition (Ruhs 2013; Ruhs and Martin 2008). 
The most common policy tools for regulating the admission of labour migrants in high-income 
countries include: (i) the requirement of a genuine job offer before admission; (ii) ‘labour market tests’ 
that require employers to advertise their vacancies in the domestic labour market for a minimum period 
of time before being certified to recruit and employ a migrant worker to ensure that employers make 
reasonable efforts to recruit local workers, although “local” is defined differently across countries; (iii) 
quotas; (iv) restrictions of the work permit holder’s employment to specific occupations and/or sectors 
of the host country; and (v) a self-sufficiency requirement that requires migrant workers to prove before 
admission that they will not rely on public funds to support themselves and their families in the host 
country. In addition, almost all TMPs require migrants to work for the employer specified on the work 
permit only – an issue we discuss in more detail later. 
While there are many commonalities in the general principles and fundamental features of labour 
immigration policies, there are also significant policy variations across political regimes, that is across 
democracies and autocracies and “varieties of capitalism” such as liberal market economies with liberal 
welfare states and coordinated market economies with other types of welfare states. For example, Ruhs 
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(2018) found that, compared with policies in democracies, labour immigration programmes in 
autocracies are more open to labour immigration, impose more restrictions of migrants’ rights, and 
exhibit stronger trade-offs between openness and rights. With regard to variations across types of 
capitalism, he found that immigration programs in liberal market economies (LMEs) impose fewer 
limits on the employment conditions of migrants but place more restrictions on migrants’ social rights 
than policies in coordinated market economies. Policy trade-offs between openness and social rights are 
more likely to occur in LMEs with liberal welfare states than in countries with other types of welfare 
states. 
What about the determinants of labour immigration programmes? Answering this question requires 
a conceptual framework for labour immigration policymaking. Research on the determinants and 
processes of migration policy formation emphasize a range of factors, including ‘statist approaches’ that 
focus on the role of the state in pursuing the “national interest” (e.g. Weiner 1995), institutions (e.g. 
Afonso and Devitt 2016; Menz 2009), interests (e.g. Freeman 1995), ideas (e.g. Balch 2009) and, more 
generally, socio-economic conditions such as the state of the economy. While public debates and the 
processes of policy-making on labour immigration vary across countries, they are often framed in 
highly consequentialist terms, i.e. based on the (perceived and/or real) costs and benefits of particular 
admission policies, without significant consideration of the interests of new migrants and/or their 
countries of origin. Humanitarian considerations typically play little role in the labour immigration 
policies of high-income countries.  
GCM labour migration recommendations 
The GCM includes 23 objectives with actionable commitments, including a wide range of goals as such 
as obtaining better migration data, providing timely and accurate information to migrants, preventing 
trafficking in persons, and enhancing the portability of social security benefits. To facilitate and promote 
the implementation of these objectives, the GCM established a “capacity building mechanism” within 
the UN to support countries in their implementation efforts. The GCM also calls on the UN to review 
each country’s progress toward achieving the GCM’s migration goals during an International Migration 
Review Forum every four years beginning in 2022. The Global Forum on Migration and Development 
is invited to “provide a space for annual information exchange on the implementation of the Global 
Compact, and report the findings, best practices and innovative approaches to the International 
Migration Review Forum”. 
GCM objectives five and six deal with labour migration and migrant workers. GCM recommendation 
five calls on governments to “enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration” by 
facilitating “labour mobility and decent work reflecting demographic and labour market realities” (para 
21), developing model labour mobility agreements by sector, and admitting migrant workers at all skill 
levels (para 21d). Migrant pathways into countries should take account of “national priorities, local and 
national labour market needs and skills supply” (e.g. para 21c), and the mechanisms used to determine 
how many migrants to admit to close skill gaps should involve input from local stakeholders, including 
employers and unions (para 21e).  
Governments are asked to develop labour mobility schemes for “temporary, seasonal, circular, and 
fast-track programmes in areas of labour shortages (para 21d).” All migrant workers should be able to 
bring or unify their families abroad, that is, the GCM calls for “reviewing” and “revising” current 
restrictions on family unification linked to income and language, type of visa, and length of stay. The 
GCM also calls on governments to provide “work authorization and access to social security and 
services” (para 21i) for the members of migrant worker families. 
GCM recommendation six calls for fair and ethical recruitment, including prohibiting recruiters from 
charging any fees to migrant workers and ensuring “that the roles and responsibilities within the 
recruitment and employment process are clearly outlined, thereby enhancing supply chain transparency” 
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(para 22e). Governments are asked to ratify and implement “relevant international instruments related 
to international labour migration” (para 22a) and to learn from best practices “to promote the full respect 
for the human and labour rights of migrant workers at all skill levels” (para 22b) and to monitor recruiters 
effectively to ensure they do not charge fees to migrant workers.  
Governments hosting migrant workers should add labour inspectors to ensure compliance with 
labour laws, guarantee that migrant workers retain their identity documents, and permit migrants to join 
unions (para 22i). Recommendation 6h calls on governments to allow migrants to change employers 
and to change the duration of their stay abroad “with minimal administrative processes” (para 22g). 
These recommendations are unlikely to effectuate real improvements in the protection of migrant 
workers because they are not likely to be implemented. The GCM recommendations are policy 
aspirations that are not objectionable per se, but they do not address the well-known trade-offs and hard 
policy questions that arise in the regulation of the admission and rights of migrant workers, especially 
in countries that host large numbers of migrants.  
First, the GCM recommendations do not deal with the central policy question of how governments 
determine whether migrant workers are needed in particular occupations and/or sectors of the domestic 
labour market. Most TMPs are “employer-led” in the sense that employers ask governments for 
permission to recruit a certain number of migrant workers with specific skills, often based on the 
argument that there are “shortages of domestic labour and skills.” Governments must assess and evaluate 
these employer shortage claims and determine whether labour immigration is the optimal response in 
light of potential alternatives such as higher wages, mechanization, imports, etc. Assessing the feasibility 
and desirability of alternatives to migrant workers raises economic and normative questions that are 
typically highly contested, since governments are deciding whose interests should be prioritized (Ruhs 
and Anderson 2010).  
Many research and policy reports discuss processes to determine if migrant workers are needed and 
alternatives to migrant workers (Migration Advisory Committee 2010; 2017), but this research and 
analysis is not addressed explicitly in the GCM. For example, instead of discussing how to oversee 
employer efforts to recruit local workers and establish minimum wages for migrants employed under 
TMPs, the GCM talks of “demographic realities” and “labour imbalances” as reasons to admit more 
migrants.  
There is a striking mismatch between the GCM’s “macro-arguments” for more legal labour migration 
pathways and the “micro-processes” and considerations that dominate real-world policy decisions. For 
example, the argument that there are general labour imbalances between high- and lower-income 
countries does not answer fundamental questions about how to evaluate and respond to employers’ 
requests for more migrant workers, e.g. how to deal with a farmer’s request for 1,000 migrant workers 
to harvest fruit. In practice, governments typically look at whether the farmer tried to recruit local 
workers at prevailing wages and whether it makes sense to admit migrants rather than encourage other 
responses, from higher wages to attract domestic workers to labour-saving mechanization and/or greater 
imports (Martin, 2018). 
A second example of where GCM ideals clash with labour market realities is the right of migrant 
workers to change employers. Almost all temporary labour migration programmes exist to fill particular 
jobs, so they restrict the employment of the admitted migrant to the employer and job specified on the 
work permit. Some programmes allow migrants to change employers, but only if the new employer 
obtains the necessary work permit and sometimes after the current employer agrees to the transfer. 
Migrant workers admitted under TMPs typically acquire the right to change employers freely only after 
they have acquired permanent residence status in the host country. 
Tying the employment of migrants to specific employers can increase the vulnerability of migrants, 
who may lose the right to be in the country if they lose their jobs. Migrants who face unsatisfactory 
working conditions have difficulty complaining unless they are willing and financially able to return 
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home. Some employers retain migrant workers’ passports and provide “tied accommodation,” making 
it hard for the migrant to leave without the employer knowing, and forcing the migrant to find alternative 
housing if fired by the employer. These realities mean that there is a strong case for thinking about how 
current policy practices that tie migrants to specific employers can be relaxed. For example, could 
migrant workers earn the right to change employers within a given occupation or sector after a minimum 
period of time such as two years? 
What would happen if migrant workers had the right to change employers upon admission, as the 
GCM suggests? The result could be a break in the one-to-one link between labour market tests that 
certify labour shortages and the employment of migrant workers. Jobs are hard to fill for a reason, and 
migrant workers are just as likely as local workers to prefer some jobs to others. Consequently, giving 
migrants the unrestricted right to change employers upon admission would make it impossible to use 
labour migration to fill jobs in particular occupations and/or sectors, and thus undermine employer and 
host country incentives to recruit and admit migrant workers in the first place. Even if migrant workers 
are restricted to particular industries and occupations rather than to specific employers, more and more 
may need to be admitted to ensure that most of the jobs that governments believe should be filled are in 
fact filled.  
A third problem is the insufficient attention given to the incentives and recruitment practices of 
employers. For example, the GCM’s call for no worker-paid recruitment fees ignores the reality that 
matching workers with jobs over borders has costs (Martin 2017). If employers pay all costs for the 
migrant workers they recruit, but migrants are then free to change employers immediately or soon after 
arrival in the host country, do employers lose their investment in migrants who change jobs? Will 
governments require the migrant’s new employer to reimburse the first employer for recruitment costs? 
Will migrants have to stay with the employer who paid their recruitment costs for a period of time before 
being eligible to change employers? These are important practical questions that need to be discussed, 
but the GCM ignores them.  
Fourth, the GCM’s recommendations on family reunion and the rights of family migrants would 
allow migrants of all skill levels to arrive with families who can receive work permits and access public 
services. Current policies in most high-income countries require most temporary migrants to prove self-
sufficiency, and most limit family reunion to migrants that satisfy minimum income thresholds. The 
GCM recommendations thus raise a host of practical questions. Will there be any labour market 
restrictions on the relatives of migrants? Will employers who recruited particular migrants be 
responsible for the costs of any public services consumed by migrant families? Questions about the 
impact of family migration on public finances are often among the central questions in public debates 
about immigration. Until such questions are answered, the GCM’s labour recommendations are likely 
to add to the widening gap between ideals and realities in labour migration. 
The GCM’s labour migration recommendations effectively substitute migrant rights principles for 
labour market realities, making them unlikely to be adopted widely. Collectively, these 
recommendations ignore some of the core principles underpinning today’s temporary labour 
immigration programmes, aiming to change them into permanent immigration programmes. Under the 
GCM recommendations, migrant workers could arrive with their families, family members could get 
work authorization and services such as education and health care, and migrants could decide to change 
employers and extend their stays. Given policy shifts in many countries over the past few decades, away 
from permanent and toward temporary migration programmes, such a fundamental change in the nature 
of labour immigration policies will be difficult to achieve in practice. 
GCR recommendation on labour mobility for refugees  
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are 25 million 
recognised refugees globally, the highest number on record. The vast majority of the global refugee 
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population, about 85 percent, is in relatively low-income countries. The ten countries hosting the largest 
numbers of refugees in 2017 included four of the world’s least developed countries (Uganda, Sudan, 
Ethiopia, and Bangladesh), four middle-income countries (Turkey, the world’s largest host with 3.5 
million refugees, as well as Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, and Jordan), and one high-income country 
(Germany, with a million refugees). Most rich countries have been reluctant to offer “resettlement 
places” for large numbers of recognised refugees from ‘first countries of asylum’ in or near conflict 
regions. The number of resettled refugees is very small compared to the total number of refugees. For 
example, in 2017 only 102,800 refugees were resettled, an almost 50% reduction from 2016 and 
equivalent to about 0.5 percent of the global refugee population (UNHCR 2018).  
The highly unequal distribution of refugees, and the shrinking of the already limited legal pathways 
to protection in rich states, have led to calls for “alternative pathways to protection.” The ‘Global 
Compact on Refugees’ recommends various “complementary pathways for admission to third countries” 
including “labour mobility opportunities for refugees, including through the identification of refugees 
with skills that are needed in third countries.” This recommendation is meant to contribute to the GCR’s 
overall aim to: “(i) ease pressures on host countries; (ii) enhance refugee self-reliance; (iii) expand 
access to third country solutions; and (iv) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety 
and dignity.” 
The implementation of labour mobility pathways for refugees faces at least five practical obstacles 
that make it highly unlikely that labour migration will become a viable “complementary pathway” for 
significant numbers of refugees who are in first countries of asylum. 2  
The first fundamental challenge is how to how to combine the humanitarian objective of protecting 
refugees with the economic objectives of labour migration policies. Most high-income countries make 
a strict distinction between ‘refugees’ and ‘labour migrants’. While refugees are typically admitted on 
humanitarian grounds, labour migrants are usually admitted to benefit the national economy and society. 
An alternative labour migration pathway for refugees based purely on humanitarian grounds would be 
akin to expanding humanitarian resettlement. At the same time, treating refugees purely as labour 
migrants without any recognition of their special status as refugees would not result in large numbers 
being admitted because refugees would need to “compete” for admission with other migrants from all 
around the world. Although “mixed-motives” migration programmes are not unprecedented3, combining 
economic and humanitarian policy objectives in a labour mobility pathway for refugees is very 
challenging politically and not likely to yield large numbers. 
A second key issue is whether refugees who enter high-income countries under labour immigration 
programmes should be allowed to “switch categories”, that is, to claim asylum. Most advocates of 
alternative pathways for refugees emphasise the importance of refugees retaining the right to seek 
protection. The GCR makes clear that any complementary pathway to protection should “contain 
appropriate protection safeguards” (para 94). However, allowing refugees who use alternative labour 
pathways to enter higher-income countries to also claim asylum would be a major disincentive for high-
income countries to admit them. If the policy goal is to provide a legal pathway for refugees to claim 
asylum in high-income countries, humanitarian visas would be better than a labour immigration 
pathway. Governments should protect the right of people to claim asylum, but respecting this right will 
most likely result in fewer admissions, setting up a trade-off between the potential scale and 
quality/conditions of protection provided.  
                                                     
2 For a longer discussion of these and other obstacles and opportunities of labour mobility pathways for refugees, see Ruhs 
(2019).  
3 For example, the so-called “Resident Seasonal Employer Programme” introduced in New Zealand (2007) and Australia 
(2008) have the explicit dual objectives of helping fill labour shortages in the host countries and promoting development 
in migrants’ countries of origin (for a discussion of these programmes, see e.g. McKenzie and Gibson 2010). 
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Third, if the goal of the labour migration pathway is to provide strictly temporary admission and 
protection, how will refugees be returned to countries of citizenship or first asylum? The most realistic 
option is to negotiate a return and readmission agreement before joining the temporary labour migration 
programme, that is, with the country of first asylum. In practice, successfully negotiating such 
readmission agreements would be a major challenge. Most first countries of asylum are low and lower-
middle income countries, so they will be under considerable pressure to negotiate opportunities for their 
own citizens to access higher-income countries. Will these first countries of asylum agree to readmission 
agreements that involve the return of refugees in exchange for greater opportunities for their own 
nationals to gain admission to higher-income countries as workers, students or family migrants? 
Fourth, most temporary labour migration programmes, especially those for lower skilled workers, 
restrict the right of migrant workers to have family members accompany them. It is difficult to see how 
admitting refugee-workers without the right to bring at least some family members would provide the 
minimum degree of protection that most refugee families seek, making at least some right to family 
reunion a likely integral part of the policy. However, this would make refugee-workers different from 
migrant workers, and require host countries to accept such exceptions and policy adjustments to their 
regular labour migration programmes.  
Finally, there are important questions about the governance of any new labour mobility pathways for 
refugees. High-income countries are likely to have different selection criteria with regard to skills, 
occupations and/or nationality that could be facilitated by the bilateral agreements commonly used in 
labour migration policies. But who will negotiate and implement such an agreement on behalf of the 
refugee-workers ? The refugees’ countries of origin cannot play this role, and first countries of asylum 
are also unlikely to be effective “advocates” and “negotiators” for refugees in their countries who wish 
to join labour immigration programmes in high-income countries.  
These are formidable obstacles to assertions that refugees could be admitted and protected as workers 
in high-income countries. Some high-income countries may agree to admit and provide some job 
opportunities for some refugees currently residing in first countries of asylum. A number of initiatives 
have placed small numbers of refugees from first countries of asylum in jobs in high-income countries. 
However, given the obstacles, it is difficult to see how such initiatives could be scaled up significantly, 
and how international labour migration could become a major option for large numbers of refugees.  
Conclusion 
Two years of discussions, consultations, and negotiations culminated in the Global Compacts on 
Migration and Refugees in summer 2018. Almost all countries, with the notable exception of the United 
States, signed the compact on refugees, and 152 countries signed the compact on migration. Five 
countries refused to sign – the United States, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Israel – and 
twelve abstained – including EU countries Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and Romania. Slovakia did 
not vote. Switzerland delayed its decision.  
In some of the countries that refused to sign the compact on migration, populist political parties 
misrepresented the GCM, arguing that it represented supra-national interference in national government 
regulation of migration and migrants. Defenders of the GCM emphasize its non-binding nature, noting 
that it does not limit national sovereignty over migration issues. However, it may be hard to call a non-
binding agreement a major “break-through” to improve the global governance of international migration 
if it offers only a “menu of policy options” from which countries can pick and choose.  
There is no doubt that the GCM fell victim to politicization in many countries, and some of the 
reasons cited by non-signers reflected domestic political concerns rather than the substance of the 
recommendations. However, this politicization and misrepresentation of the GCM should not obscure 
or minimize discussions of the major gaps between the GCM ideals and labour market realities that we 
have highlighted.  
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GCM recommendations five and six would effectively convert temporary migration programmes 
into permanent immigration programs, with newcomers selected by employers who paid all of their 
costs. Migrants would arrive with their families and be free to change employers and prolong their stays. 
These GCM recommendations seem to reject the need for labour market tests that require employers to 
prove local workers are not available. The GCM does not deal with the consequences of more expensive 
migrant workers for employer demand for migrants, as when higher costs reduce the demand for 
migrants. Similarly, the GCR recommendation to create labour migration pathways for refugees does 
not acknowledge the realities of how employers recruit migrant workers.  
The GCM can effectuate positive changes in some areas of global governance, such as a reformed 
institutional architecture within the UN system to deal with migration issues in a more systematic and 
coordinated way. However, the core recommendations that relate to labour migration, and the idea of 
bringing refugees into labour mobility programmes, have very limited chances of success due to large 
gaps between ideals and realities. 
What comes next? The GCM implementation process can improve protections for migrant workers, 
but only if implementation begins from labour market realities rather than abstract ideals. For example, 
perhaps employers should pay worker recruitment costs, but exactly which costs? Are the costs that 
workers incur before they obtain a contract to work for a particular employer abroad reimbursable? What 
about required or optional pre-departure training? Even a cursory glance at the research on recruitment 
costs shows that these are important but complex issues (Martin, 2017). If employers pay migrant worker 
costs, can they effectively deduct such costs from migrant workers’ wages by paying them less? 
The GCM needs to consider protection priorities. What specific restrictions of migrant rights are 
most harmful for migrant workers? How can host countries be persuaded to lift these restrictions, or at 
least address their adverse consequences? Is there a list of ‘core welfare rights’ that migrant workers 
should be granted under all temporary migration programmes (e.g. Ruhs 2017)? Debating and 
responding to these questions with practical answers would do more to improve protections for migrant 
workers than general calls to sign the relevant international conventions, some of which stipulate a 
comprehensive set of rights without any sense of protection priorities.  
More ‘labour market realism‘ in debates about global labour migration and labour mobility pathways 
for refugees could do more to protect workers than ideals and aspirations that simply widen gaps 
between goals and realities. An incremental and bottom-up approach to improving protections for 
migrant workers is long overdue, and we hope that the next step will be moving from grand visions to 
practical realities.  
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